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“Labour market policy was arguably the centerpiece of apartheid's mechanism of social control and of 
its economic growth strategy. Poverty, discrimination and inequality were all hallmarks of its 
workings and consequences. Labour market policy was the site of some of the system's most 
draconian elements-the pass laws and job reservation to name but two. The labour market was also 
associated with some of apartheid's greatest failures and defeats...the new government has been faced 
not merely with a policy vacuum, but also with a terrible legacy in the South African labour market: 
mass unemployment and poverty, discrimination and inequality, intense conflict at the workplace, 
low levels of productivity and a marked absence of the managerial and technical skills required to 
drive an economy increasingly open to the rigorous tests of international competition.”1 
 
South Africa has emerged from a history dogged by an oppressive system in which race was 
used as a medium of oppression. The system established developmental demarcations along 
racial lines. These demarcations are still evident in skewed workplace demographics. 2 
Stratifications are not the problem per se, but rather the disadvantage that comes with it.3 
Underrepresentation of a group of people in the workplace usually means that there is unequal 
distribution of wealth. It is imperative that persons from all walks of life occupy decision making 
positions in order to ensure participation of all groups in the making of decisions that affect their 
lives. Affirmative action was devised as a means to ameliorate this problem. Nonetheless, despite 
legislation sanctioning affirmative action having been in place for nineteen years,4 the situation 
remains unchanged.  
 
 
                                                             
1
 Preface to the 1996 report of the Presidential Commission to investigate Labour market policy entitled 
Restructuring the South African Labour Market. In O Dupper “The current Legislative framework” in E. M. L. 
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1.2 Problem statement 
South Africa is a democratic state based on a written Constitution.5 The Constitution is a product 
of negotiations to eradicate the previous system which was characterized by deprivation, denial 
and strife. The legislative instrument employed to facilitate change in access and advancement in 
the workplace is affirmative action. However, it appears that when the legislature set out to 
redress the imbalances apparent in South African society, it not only failed to solve the problem 
of inequality but instead exacerbated the existing problems. 
From its inception affirmative action has been criticized for breaching equality rights. Courts 
have, however, condoned the implementation of affirmative action for the objective it seeks to 
achieve.6 What is clear from the reasoning behind this acceptance, however, is that affirmative 
action was meant to be a temporary remedy to rectify inequalities in various communities. 
Critics of affirmative action have noted that in its application, affirmative action compromises 
efficiency,7 especially in instances where gender or race has been used as a basis to overlook 
highly qualified candidates and appoint less qualified persons in their stead. Affirmative action 
has caused persons with skills to leave both the country and the public sector. Having traversed a 
period of nineteen years in the era of democracy, what is brought into question is whether the 
program of affirmative action should be retained. 
1.3 Literature review 
Affirmative action is a widely researched topic and space and time does not allow consideration 
of all the literature. However, there exists a commonality in the aspects articulated by the authors 
and this literature review confines its analysis to the writings of selected authors whose work are 
representative of the field. The views discussed in this literature review thus focuses on the views 
of Pretorius,8 Rycroft,9 Dupper, 10Garbers, Hepple11 and Fredman.12 
                                                             
5
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996(hereinafter referred to as the Constitution). 
6
 A Rycroft “Obstacles to Employment Equity: The Role of Judges and Arbitrators in the Interpretation and 
Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies” (1999) 20 ILJ 1411, pg1413. 
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8
 J L Pretorius “Accountability, Contextualization and the Standard of Judicial Review of Affirmative Action: 
Solidarity obo Barnard vs South African Police Services” (2013) 130 SALJ 31; J L Pretorius “Fairness in 
Transformation: A critique of the Constitutional Court’s Affirmative Action Jurisprudence” (2010) 26 SAJHR 536. 
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One of the themes shared in affirmative action literature is that the law is inadequate to effect 
social change. Hepple is of the opinion that it is too ambitious to employ the law to effect social 
change. 13He cites the absence of an identifiable tortfeasor as a factor hindering bringing the 
cycle of disadvantage into the precincts of the law.14 He explains that this frustrates the element 
of causation which is necessary if anti-discrimination measures are to be enforced effectively.15  
This postulation is based on an understanding of inequality as a result of individualized acts of 
prejudice hence the insistence on identifying a tortfeasor before the remedy can succeed. Hepple 
assumes that once the culprit has been identified, restraining measures in the form of rights can 
be enforced against the tortfeasor and inequality be curtailed. Fredman, on the other hand, 
dispels Hepple‟s assertion by saying that substantive equality goes well beyond individual acts of 
prejudice.16 She reasons cogently that by making equality a right, a positive duty is imposed on 
the state to provide remedies even though it is not at fault.17 That way, the state can identify 
institutions in a best position to effect change, enact laws to facilitate provision of goods and 
ameliorate social inequalities.18 This dissertation agrees with Fredman‟s assertion and goes on to 
evaluate whether the state has identified a proper institution to effect the composition of social 
demographics. 
The second limitation given by Hepple is that legislation dealing with redress concentrates on 
one element as a cause of disadvantage, namely discrimination.19 He opines that this makes it 
inadequate to deal with collective group disadvantage. Further to that, he agrees with the 
submission in the 1996 Green Paper on Policy Proposals for the Employment and Occupational 
Equity Statute,20 which stated that racial inequalities do not primarily arise from discrimination.21 
Such assertions are underpinned by the fact that it is erroneous to assume that society would have 
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  O Dupper “Affirmative Action: Who, How and How Long?” (2008) 24 SAJHR  425. 
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  S Fredman “Providing equality: Substantive equality and the positive duty to provide” (2005) 21 SAJHR 166. 
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  Hepple note 11 above. 
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  Ibid 605. 
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  Ibid. 
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 Fredman (note 16 above) 168. 
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 Notice 804 of 1996 Government Gazette vol 373 1 July 1996. 
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 Hepple (note 11 above) 603. 
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been equal if it was not for past discrimination.22 It is argued (not dismissing the adversity of 
discrimination) that other factors contributed to present day social disparities.23 This dissertation 
then undertakes to evaluate how such assumptions have proved detrimental and defeated the 
objective of redress. 
Another factor in Hepple‟s argument is the way the law is focused.24He argues that inequalities 
in the workplace lie in pre-entry discrimination.25 He then advocates „a variety of governmental 
and private programs for education, training, and reconstruction‟.26 This dissertation agrees with 
Hepple, in that the solution lies in the regulation of pre market institutions. This dissertation 
takes the proposal a step further by articulating how such an option is relevant and how it could 
be more effective than affirmative action. 
Another theme addressed in the literature on affirmative action is the use of race in determining 
eligibility for affirmative action. McGregor27 elucidates the advantages and deficiencies which 
come with this approach. She takes an optimistic approach by asserting that such shortcomings 
can be ameliorated through amendments to the statutory instruments providing for affirmative 
action. Overall, she draws attention to the obvious fact that affirmative action is both under 
inclusive and over inclusive whereas it ought to account for multiple disadvantages that underlie 
the present day society.28 She concurs with the role model theory29 as a just explanation for over 
inclusiveness. Nevertheless, she acknowledges that over inclusiveness is a serious problem 
because it can create animosity among people of the same group and also that it intercepts aid 
meant for those persons who are genuinely disadvantaged. Despite such inconsistencies this 
dissertation questions the extent to which the role model theory has materialised. It will be 
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 M Van Wyk & K Hofmeyer “Affirmative Action Target Setting: More than Just a Head Count” (1997) 21 SA J of 
Labour Relations 5, 6; Van Wyk argues that that it cannot be proven and is highly unlikely that if previous 
discrimination is factored out what remains is an equal society. 
23
 Hepple note 11 above. 
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 M McGregor “Categorization to determine beneficiaries of affirmative action: Advantages and Deficiencies” 
(2005) 46 Codicillus 1- 12. 
28
 Ibid 6. 
29
 The role model theory states that the mere instance of having people of colour in high places encourages the 
deconstruction of stereotypes against blacks where they are perceived as incapable. It also states that it sets the 
pace of social participation for people of colour.  
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revealed through statistics, how, despite having role models, the expected cascading affirmative 
action has not materialised. 
This conflict of the use of race for eligibility to benefit from affirmative action is further 
explored by Rycroft.30  In ascertaining what the role of judges is, he identifies situations in which 
conflict is most likely to occur in the application of affirmative action.31 He goes on to justify 
assumed group identity. The basis of his support is premised on the difficulty in calculating 
individual disadvantage as well as the risk of such an endeavor exacerbating racial conflict.32 
Realizing the risk of compromising standards through a generous interpretation of section 20 of 
the EEA, Rycroft proposes the establishment of a minimum threshold for prospective candidates. 
In brief, he criticizes a conservative approach when interpreting the precepts of affirmative 
action to workplace practice. This dissertation dispels such insistence and goes to show that 
courts have failed to balance the conflict between individual equality and social redress goals. 
Pretorius does not depart much from Rycroft‟s views.33 Nevertheless, he is of the opinion that 
the standard of scrutiny against affirmative action should change from rationality to 
proportionality. 34 His discussion revolves around the reasoning in a number of judgments where 
he finds hints of this possibility which are however not followed through. He argues that a 
balance can be struck between conflicting values if affirmative action is subjected to the 
proportionality test. Again, experience shows that this has been more theoretical than practical. It 
therefore provides a basis for the argument that affirmative action should be removed from 
employment law and replaced by a policy which does not threaten the Constitutional goal of an 
egalitarian state. 
The contribution of Fredman to the issue of affirmative action builds on the foundations of the 
concept of equality.35 Fredman‟s writings focus mainly on clarifying the meaning of substantive 
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 A Rycroft “Obstacles to Employment Equity: The Role of Judges and Arbitrators in the Interpretation and 
Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies” (1999)20 ILJ 1411. 
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 These include when hiring and when promoting people. 
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 Rycroft (note 30 above) 1423. 
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 Fredman (note16 above) 163. 
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equality and its links to proactive obligations.36 Fredman articulates how and why it is necessary 
that equality be established as a right than left to be a matter of welfare or mere policy.37 Her 
writing takes a paternalistic approach that makes it clear that judicial deference would be 
inimical to the protection of minority rights, whose access to political process is minimal and 
inadequate for their protection.38 Just like Pretorius39 she advocates for further involvement of 
the judiciary in the evaluation of policy, especially the eligibility criteria used in the distribution 
of social goods. However, she points out that this is not to second guess policy makers decisions 
but is a way of ensuring and maintaining the egalitarian society envisaged by the Constitution.40  
She contends that it is a way of achieving accountability by policymakers through „providing 
open, transparent and reasonable reasons, based on proper evidence rather than generalizations or 
assumptions which are at high risk of incorporating damaging stereotypes or worsening the lot of 
the disadvantaged‟. 41  The discussion by Fredman is centered on socio-economic rights as 
provided for in section 27 of the Constitution. This dissertation shifts the focus from socio 
economic rights in general to employment law and in particular the exclusion of specific groups 
of people from employment opportunities through redress measures termed affirmative action. 
This dissertation imports the reasoning of Fredman to show how by passage of time the route 
taken by affirmative action has threatened the realization of an egalitarian state. 
 
Dupper addresses the issues of beneficiaries of affirmative action, its implementation and the 
time frame in which it ought to operate. 42  He queries the use of race as a criterion for 
eligibility,43 asserting that the use of race is only legitimate when race is synonymous with 
disadvantage. He postulates that such criterion might become inappropriate when disadvantage 
no longer follows the axis of race.44 This dissertation avers that the time referred by Dupper has 
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 Ibid at 166. 
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arrived and thus a way should be devised to ensure that aid goes to the right people, if real 
change is to be realized. 
Dupper explores the dichotomy of section 9(2) and 9(3)45 and explains how it is justified that 
redistribution interests take precedence over individual rights.46He avers that as long as non-
designated group members are not made to suffer undue harm, redress measures can safely take 
precedence over individual rights. This dissertation argues that although a balance ought to be 
struck between competing rights, courts have failed to do so.   
Dupper argues that a sunset clause would be permissible where affirmative action is meant to 
compensate for past discrimination.47 He suggests that, since affirmative action is goal oriented, 
a sunset clause would not be permissible until the objective of equal representivity is 
achieved. 48Dupper dismisses the possibility of phasing out affirmative action entirely. 49  He 
submits that phasing affirmative action out poses a danger of upsetting the balanced 
representation that would have been achieved. 50  He proposes that what would rather be 
permissible is to relegate it to a supportive role than a decisive one. What Dupper fails to 
appreciate is that affirmative action is supposed to be temporary. This dissertation proposes that 
a new way to achieve the objectives of affirmative action should be devised so that once its goals 
are achieved, the instrument falls away.  
 
From the plethora of writings on the subject of affirmative action, a discernible pattern exists. 
The criticism of over inclusiveness ranks high.  There are blacks who are better off and in no 
need of aid from affirmative action. Another consistent argument from the writers is that it is 
possible to apply affirmative action and achieve a balance between individual equity and social 
redress. The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate the criticism leveled against affirmative 
action and to determine whether such criticism warrants the abrogation of affirmative action.  In 
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addition it aims to evaluate the economic ramifications of using affirmative action in the 
workplace. 
1.4 Research questions 
Not knowing a question is to forfeit the answer. The following questions will be considered in 
this dissertation. 
1. What is affirmative action? 
a) What prompted the policy? 
b) What were its goals? 
c) How was it implemented? (legal framework in which it was coined) 
 
2. What are the challenges to the policy? 
a) Does it infringe constitutional rights? 
b) Has it achieved anything? 
c) What is its effect on the labour market and trends? 
 
3. Are the problems unique to South Africa? 
a) What experience does the USA share with South Africa? 
b) Which lessons can be learnt from this experience? 
 
4. Is continuation of affirmative action in South Africa still desirable? 
 
1.5 Focus of Research 
The concept of affirmative action involves a number of areas. These include among many, 
business ownership, gender aspects, disability and racial issues. However, the constraints of a 
dissertation do not allow for all aspects to be dealt with and this research will focus its 
attention on the racial aspect of affirmative action in the labour market. This is not to say that 
those aspects left out are of less value. Every aspect covered by affirmative action is of 




1.6 Research outline 
The purpose of Chapter 1 is to provide the context for the research by considering a brief 
historical background underpinning the socio-politico economic environment of South Africa. 
Chapter 2 identifies the concepts of equality in which affirmative action is rooted. The chapter 
also provides an overview of the legislative framework in which affirmative action finds 
expression. The standards of review articulated serve as a basis on which affirmative action can 
be evaluated. 
Chapter 3 provides the core discussion of the dissertation with arguments against affirmative 
action being presented. It articulates the legal implications of affirmative action that make it 
necessary to see to it that it is brought to an end. The adverse economic consequences of 
implementing affirmative action are also referred to and a look at statistics is employed to 
concretize the argument against affirmative action. 
Chapter 4 compares the American jurisprudence with South African jurisprudence to substantiate 
arguments against affirmative action, namely its inability to effect change and its adverse impact 
on economic viability of business. The length of the period in which affirmative action has been 
in place in America enables the prospects of success of affirmative action in South Africa to be 
evaluated. The comparison also allows for a discussion of how a change in approach might 
impact on effectiveness. 
Chapter 5 proposes alternatives to preferential employment or promotions. A number of 
proposals are advanced including skills development. This proposal is informed by the symbiotic 
relationship between lack of skill and low recruitment amongst designated group members. The 
chapter closes by summing up the findings of the entire dissertation. The dissertation concludes 
that affirmative action infringes the right to equality, fails to advance the masses, is not 






CHAPTER 2: THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY 
“Where the government itself steps in to undertake a departure from the status quo as a matter 
of social policy, we require that its justifications rise to a particularly high standard. [This 
remains so] even though the weight of our scarred racial history may be invoked in order to 
justify such policies”. 51 
2.1 Outline 
Equality as a value and right stands to inform all law and is a standard against which all law is 
tested for Constitutionality.52 It is therefore necessary that transformation takes place within the 
precincts of equality. The aspect of equality is compound and made up of different concepts. 
This chapter unbundles the notions making up the concept and goes on to highlight principles of 
constitutionalism in a transitional state and considers how established standards are interpreted.   
 
2.2 Equality  
 
As in all transitional states, equality assumes a functional meaning in South Africa.53 In the 
South African context, equality marks a break from the past and a benchmark for an objective. 
The history of South Africa is synonymously recognized with inequality made possible through 
structures of segregation. It is for this reason that the Constitution envisages equality as a 
founding value and an enforceable right.54 The interaction of the law and this principle in the 
workplace has centered on accessing the labour market and career advancement. The best way to 
achieve this has been the subject of much controversy and the way it has been settled has been 
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 C A Ford “Challenges and Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic Identity in American and Post-Apartheid South African 
Affirmative Action” (1953) Christopher 43 UCLA L. Rev, 2015. 
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 Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others [2013] ZALCCT 38 para 22. 
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 JC Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa 2
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 ed (2013) 1. 
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2.3Formal equality  
Formal equality refers to the basic notion of equality which holds that like should be treated 
alike.55 The notion provides that characteristics of identity such as race, gender and religion do 
not warrant considering people different.56 Every person is considered to have an equal capacity 
to hold rights. Such capacity is protected by enacting laws which require that the state and 
individuals refrain from action which infringes such capacity and the right. If it happens that this 
capacity is violated, formal equality requires that the situation be remedied by simple extension 
of rights so violated. Such reasoning is the basis upon which civil and political rights were 
extended to Africans after years of servitude.57 After providing that like should be treated alike, 
the notion of formal equality does not provide how those who are different (and at a 
disadvantage) ought to be treated.58 Thus the notion leaves those who are different vulnerable. 
Individuals face the predicament of having to conform to the abstract of what is deemed normal 
or face detriment.59 Formal equality therefore only demands negative action for the preservation 
of equality. For failure to recognize the impact of circumstances of individuals and failure to 
provide for positive action, formal equality is deemed inept to address equity issues. 
 
2.4 Substantive equality 
Substantive equality was developed from the failings of formal equality. There are at least four 
ways to approach substantive equality namely “equality of results, equal opportunities; 
substantive rights and a broad value driven approach”. 60  Albertyn is of the opinion that 
substantive equality has four characteristics namely concern with impact of a measure on society, 
acceptance of difference, purposive and value based approach to rights to achieve equality. 61 
Equality of results was conceived out of the realization that identical treatment does not result in 
equal positions. In other words, anti discrimination laws are not adequate to achieve the 
transformational goal as envisaged in the Constitution. On the other hand, equality of 
opportunities is an acknowledgement of the fact that persons of different social groups are 
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 S Fredman “Facing the future: substantive equality under the spotlight” in O Dupper and C Garbers (eds) Equality 
in the workplace: Reflections from South Africa and Beyond (2009) 17. 
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 C Barnard and B Hepple “Substantive Equality” (2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal 562, 564. 
61
 C Albertyn “Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa” (2007) 23 SAJHR 253, 258. 
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positioned differently and cannot compete equally. This contextual approach to equality is the 
hallmark of substantive equality. It recognizes the effect of history on people‟s capacities. It 
therefore makes it necessary that proactive measures be taken to counteract the effect of 
historical factors on the realization of full human potential. Such action is allowed to the extent 
that it corrects the inequality of those being compared. 
 
Substantive equality aims to eradicate socio-economic inequalities and the structures that cause 
them. Social inequality refers to situation whereby exclusion from a benefit is based on a 
person‟s social identity.  Economic inequality refers to “unequal access to, and distribution of, 
basic needs, opportunities and material resources”.62  Economic inequality in employment law 
manifests itself in underrepresentation in the workplace. Such underrepresentation means that 
there is an unequal distribution of resources such as jobs. It therefore is incumbent that measures 
be taken to redistribute such resources.  
 
However, this does not mean that differences should be eliminated. Substantive equality requires 
the removal of difference which is tied to disadvantage.63 Thus if being underrepresented in the 
workforce means unequal access to economic benefits of being in a job, such a scenario needs to 
be rectified.  This, however, needs to be done in accordance with the Constitution.64 
  
Substantive equality recognizes the dignity and worth of an individual. Most importantly, 
substantive equality demands that the interpretation of rights should take into account both the 
context in which violation of rights takes place and the purpose for which the right was created.65 
This nuanced approach ensures that measures taken and decision made remain in line with the 
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 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA490 (CC) para 
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2.5 Equality as a right 
Equality finds expression as a right in the Constitution.67 Section 9 of the Constitution provides 
for the right to equality and has been interpreted to embrace substantive equality.68From the 
purpose of the Constitution, 69  it can be concluded that the equality clause is meant to be 
interpreted in line with substantive equality.70 This is so because section 9(2) explicitly places a 
positive duty on the state to ensure equality. Thus such departure from identical treatment and 
recognition of the effects of the past on the present goes to the core of substantive equality. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the inclusion of indirect discrimination seeks to address structural 
barriers to equality as is aimed at by substantive equality.  
 
The case of Harksen vs Lane No 71 lays down the test by which conduct and law could be tested 
for consistency with the right to equality. The test involves a three stage enquiry. The first 
enquiry is whether there has been differentiation between people or categories of people. If 
differentiation has actually occurred it has to be considered if such differentiation has a rational 
connection to a legitimate government purpose. Absence of such a connection amounts to 
violation of section 9(1). However, even if such connection is there, conduct or law 
differentiating persons or categories of persons can still amount to discrimination.72 
 
The law does not proscribe discrimination but unfair discrimination. Firstly it has to be 
established whether the differentiation amounts to discrimination. If the differentiation is based 
on a specified ground, 73  discrimination is taken to have occurred. 74  If the differentiation 
complained of is not on a specified ground, then discrimination can only be deemed present upon 
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 Section 9 of the Constitution. 
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 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 41; Brink vs Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA (CC) 
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 Breaking the cycle of disadvantage that characterised the past and establishing a democratic state committed to 
development and upholding human rights. 
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 Dupper (note 1 above) pg 18. 
71
 Harksen vs Lane No 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
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 In Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) the court held that this does not mean discrimination has a 
neutral meaning. 
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 Specified ground under section 9(3) of the Constitution and Section 6 of the EEA. 
74
 Para 49 it was held that the presumption exist because the listed grounds reflect ways in which people were in 
which people were marginalized during apartheid. Thus the presumption exist so as to safeguard against the 
continuation of that system (E Grant and J G Small “Disadvantage and discrimination: the emerging jurisprudence 
of the South African Constitutional Court” (2000) 51 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 174,180. 
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establishing that it is based on a ground that has the potential to impair human dignity.75 The 
second leg of the second stage is determining whether the differentiation amounts to unfair 
discrimination. If the differentiation is based on a specified ground, unfairness is presumed.76 If 
the differentiation is not based on an unspecified ground, the applicant has to establish that it is 
unfair discrimination. The ultimate determinant of unfairness is the impact of the discrimination 
on the victim. 
 
The fairness of the impact that differentiation has on a complainant can be determined by three 
factors. The first is the consideration whether the complainant was prejudiced by past 
discrimination. Secondly, the purpose of the differentiating law or conduct.  The purpose has to 
be a legitimate governmental goal for which power was given. The enquiry does not end there. 
The final factor is the consideration whether and extent to which the complainant‟s rights have 
been affected. The major consideration in this regard is whether the complainant‟s dignity has 
been seriously impaired.77 These considerations make it clear that previous disadvantage is not 
the sole factor in determining fairness.78 
 
The final stage of the three stage enquiry is justification under the limitation clause. If the second 
stage shows that the discrimination is unfair, the court has to determine whether the law or 
conduct in question can be justified under the provisions of section 36 of the Constitution. The 
appropriateness of this test is found in its ability to balance contending collective and individual 
rights. 
 
2.6 Designated group  
Eligibility for affirmative action is determined upon the stratification formerly used by the 
apartheid system. The EEA identifies race as one of the criteria to determine eligibility for 
affirmative action benefits.79  This group is branded „designated‟ and is assumed to contain 
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people who were prejudiced by the previous system of apartheid.80 Such an assumption is an 
executive prerogative in which the state has discretionary power to categorize persons in the 
distribution of resources and to establish the order of priority when such distribution is 
undertaken.81 Persons belonging to this group are given an identical group characteristic. In this 
instance all are assumed to have been prejudiced by the system of apartheid. The assumption 
implies that but for apartheid; persons in this group would have advanced with their careers.82 It 
is on this basis that the term black was extended from referring to Africans only to include 
Indians, Chinese and Coloureds.83 Such a homogenized character is supposed to entitle an equal 
claim to redress measures.84  Even though the use of race has been challenged, it has been 
justified on the basis of the objective pursued. 85  It has been held that race conscious 
categorization is necessary for the eradication of disadvantage that has become synonymous with 
race.86 
 
2.7 Affirmative action defined 
Affirmative action is defined as    
“measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from designated groups have equal 
opportunities and are equitably represented across all occupational categories and levels in the 
workforce of a designated employer”.87 
What is clear from this definition is that the Act gives a purposive meaning to affirmative action. 
However, in the workplace affirmative action has manifested itself in the form of preferential 
hiring and promotion of those presumed to be disadvantaged by apartheid. Both these definitions 
carry with them value laden terms which need unpacking. This is addressed below. 
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2.8 Purpose of affirmative action 
Affirmative action is a goal oriented concept. The purpose of affirmative action finds expression 
in two legal instruments, namely the Constitution and the EEA. Section 9(2) of the Constitution 
provides:    
 
“Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken”.88 
 
From this provision it can be established that the purpose of affirmative action is to advance 
persons from designated groups. A careful reading of section 9(2) depicts that there are people 
prejudiced by discrimination that need to be advanced. This understanding depicts the 
ameliorative nature of affirmative action. Steps taken must ensure that people fully enjoy their 
rights and freedoms. Affirmative action was enacted to correct imbalances in social standings 
between people from different groups. 
 
In line with the purpose illustrated above, Moseneke J in Minister of Finance and another vs Van 
Heerden laid, 89 down a test to determine whether affirmative action is constitutional. It was held: 
“It seems to me that to determine whether a measure falls within section 9(2) the enquiry is 
threefold. The first yardstick relates to whether the measure targets persons or categories of 
persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination; the second is whether the 
measure is designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of persons; and the third 
requirement is whether the measure promotes the achievement of equality”.90 
 
It is on the basis of this test that the following chapter evaluates affirmative action. The first 
requirement has been addressed under the sub heading “designated group” above. The second 
requirement needs further expansion to see how courts have interpreted it. 
 
 The court has interpreted that the term “designed” entails a properly drafted plan.91 This serves 
to avoid arbitrariness in the way an employer would carry out affirmative action.92It is for this 
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reason that the court refused to condone the employer‟s refusal to promote an employee for 
affirmative action grounds where a plan did not exist. 93 The specifications with which these 
equity plans are to comply with are provided for under chapter three of the EEA. 94  The 
employment equity plan should carry a likelihood of advancing the designated persons.95 Thus 
the validity of the employment equity plan is based on its ability to achieve what it sets out to, 
namely advancing designated persons. 
 
The last requirement entails a consideration of whether the measure will lead to the attainment of 
substantive equality.96Judge Moseneke held that this entails considering the effect of the measure 
on society.97 It therefore means that the measure is tested against its ability to effect change 
namely alteration of workplace demographics as well as not causing substantial and undue harm 
to the non-designated members.98 
 
The EEA adds the aspect of equitable representation to the purpose of affirmative action given in 
section 9(2).99 The meaning of this term is not expressly provided for under the Act but has been 
taken to mean a situation whereby the workplace demographics are the same as those of the 
population of the country.100 Proponents of affirmative action have argued that until this is 
achieved, it will not make sense to talk of a sunset clause.101 The following chapter will explain 
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2.9 Who is to implement affirmative action? 
The Act designates employers to adopt redress measures. 102 The procedure to be followed in 
adopting such is laid down in chapter III of the Act.103 A lot of contention has arisen from these 
employers‟ obligation. The main contention has come from the assumption taken by many and 
endorsed by courts, namely that as long as it can be shown that there exists an affirmative action 
plan designed in accordance with chapter three of the Act, any employment decision based on it 
is beyond judicial scrutiny.104 Such an approach is in line with the standard of rationality which 
is discussed below. 
 
2.10 Standards set in achieving transformation 
Affirmative action involves the distribution of resources that impacts on collective and individual 
rights.105 Courts have been frequently approached to decide on how affirmative action ought to 
be applied and which standard of review ought to be employed. The dilemma in which the law is 
caught between has seen the court‟s opinion split. The courts have vacillated between 
proportionality and rationality as the possible standard of scrutiny. 
2.11 Rationality  
Rationality is an inquiry into the logical relation of a measure to its objective.106 The test requires 
that the measure must be causally linked to its objective. 107 Du Plessis holds that the 
Constitutional Court has narrowed the rationality review to a determination of a “rational 
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connection between the premise and conclusion”.108 He makes this point clear by reference to 
Merafong v President of the Republic of South Africa 109 where the court ruled out the ability of 
an adjudicator to consider less onerous alternatives to deal with a legal problem.110 In applying 
this test, courts have preferred a non-exacting standard so as to allow „significant measure of 
latitude to the government‟.111 The rationality test in labour matters is derived from a narrow 
interpretation of the provisions of section 9(2) of the Constitution.  This requires that the measure 
taken in line with affirmative must be intended to balance representation in the workplace and 
secondly must be „capable of doing so‟.112 
The majority opinion in Van Heerden held that affirmative action is subject to the rationality test 
only.113 Pretorius points out that Mokgoro J was referring to the establishment of rationality as 
the sole condition for constitutional compliance when she averred that „it would be inimical if 
the state would be required to show that its restitutionary measures are fair‟.114 Fredman asserts 
that such reasoning emanates from the fact that the positive duty to redistribute social goods is a 
duty of a political nature and traditionally left to politicians.115 She however adds that this does 
not justify abdicating judicial monitoring of the way such is carried out.116 Her justification is 
based on the democratic principle of accountability and the need to protect the politically 
vulnerable groups.117  Therefore courts have a duty to ask for justified criterion of eligibility or 
exclusion.118  
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Affirmative action is not an exception to the right to equality.119 Such an assertion can only be 
true if the extent of affirmative action measures are delimited by principles of non-
discrimination.120 Affirmative action would be an exception to equality if it is applied in a way 
that does not account for its effect on individuals affected (both affirmed and deprived).121 
Pretorius makes reference to Van Heerden where it was held that „the starting point of equality 
analysis is almost always a comparison between affected classes‟.122 His reference serves to 
indicate that the Court was conscious of the need for proportional considerations when 
adjudicating equity measures. He, however, laments that although Moseneke J started out his 
analysis with a proportionality approach, the enquiry was reduced to a rationality test. Pretorius 
notes that rationality is one sided and concludes that it is “ill-suited to fulfill the basic function of 
an equality actualising norm, since it lacks the normative content to be able to determine whether 
a differentiating measure actually promotes the overall purpose of s 9”. 123  This conclusion 
enlightens one to the inappropriateness of rationality as a test against which affirmative action 
ought to be scrutinised. 
2.12 Proportionality 
Proportionality on the other hand refers to a standard of judicial scrutiny that involves the 
balancing of contending values.124 The standard is used by decision makers to determine whether 
a measure has exceeded the requirements for attaining a legitimate goal.  This usually involves a 
cost benefit analysis.125Critics of proportionality as a standard for review have castigated it on 
the grounds that it favours the complainant and defeats the remedial goal of affirmative action.126 
Pretorius counters this argument by adding that the incorrectness of such assertions lies in the 
assumption that the enquiry ends with the consideration of the impact of affirmative action on a 
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complainant.127 Proportionality goes on to balance contending interests taking into account all 
relevant factors. 128 The cumulative effect of these factors determines which side weighs more 
than the other. The provision of section 36 of the Constitution ensures that the redress goal is 
given its due weight.129 Proportionality is more compatible with the attainment and maintenance 
of an egalitarian state because it is cognisant of competing interests and strikes an optimal 
reasonable balance in accommodating them.130 
Proportionality is also preferable in that it results in decisions that are „strongly congruent with 
the constitutional and other public interests at stake‟. 131  Pretorius chooses to support 
proportionality as a proper standard on the grounds that proportionality does away with 
„ideological, dogmatic or otherwise abstract ranking‟ of constitutional provisions.132 
In all, even though the duty to decide who should benefit and the order of priority is a mandate 
better executed by the legislature, a program designed to exclude certain people from socio-
economic benefits should be scrutinised using the criteria of proportionality. Proportionality is 
preferable because of its ability to account for the duty to redress societal imbalances and at the 
same time cater for individual rights.   
2.13 Summation of findings  
All in all, the above has been an interaction with principles upon which affirmative action is 
built. The interaction has managed to establish the purpose of affirmative action, namely to 
establish a means through which equal participation could be facilitated, equal opportunity to 
compete in the labour market and consequently to reflect this in the workforce demographics. 
The discussion has established ideal approaches as well as the current approach adopted by our 
courts. What then follows is an evaluation of the current approach to affirmative action adopted 
by our courts whilst contrasting it with the ideals enumerated above. 
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CHAPTER 3: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CHALLENGED 
“We are all prisoners of our own experience and knowledge. It is difficult, even 
threatening, to have to admit that many of the things we preached and practiced were 
mistaken from the start or have become obsolete.”133 
3.1 Outline 
Having been versed with what informs the formulation of affirmative action, this chapter then 
moves on to address why it is imperative that affirmative action should come to an end. The 
main thrust of the argument will be on constitutional grounds and economic considerations that 
necessitate the phasing out of affirmative action in the employment sector. 
3.2 Temporary nature of affirmative action 
Affirmative action by its very nature is a temporary measure. Continuation with affirmative 
action indefinitely would be to go against international instruments which categorically state that 
affirmative action is temporary. The International Labour Organization Convention 111 of 1958 
provides that measures such as affirmative action ought to be temporary.134 Also, the Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women135 permits affirmative action 
as a temporary measure aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women. Such 
reference to international instruments is in line with section 233 of the Constitution which 
obliges courts to interpret all statutory provisions in accordance with international law standards. 
Section 3(b) and the Preamble to the EEA make it mandatory to interpret the EEA in line with 
international instruments. Section 39(1) (b) of the Constitution also provides for the 
consideration of international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. Courts‟ acceptance of the 
need to apply the law in accordance with international law is evident in judgments in which these 
instruments were referred to.136 Thus, the indefinite continuation with affirmative action is a 
violation of both international instruments and indirectly the Constitution. 
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Continuing with affirmative action indefinitely would amount to reverse discrimination. Reverse 
discrimination refers to a situation whereby the discriminated person exchanges positions with 
the discriminator. This simply that means the system of discrimination remains and what only 
changes is that the person who was oppressed now becomes the oppressor.  Having traversed 
nineteen years into the era of freedom, it has become reasonable to question the lifespan of 
affirmative action. The EEA mandates that equity plans designed by individual members must 
have a life span of five years which can be renewed if need be.137 However, it is difficult to 
comprehend why the same could not be applied to the whole affirmative action system 
nationwide.  
Affirmative action on a permanent basis reinforces stereotypes widely held against people of 
colour. Apartheid was informed by white supremacy and blacks were perceived as inferior in all 
faculties of life. 138  In addition to establishing diversity, affirmative action was brought to 
deconstruct stereotypes.139 Carrying on with the application of affirmative action indefinitely 
goes against this objective. This is so in that continuation with affirmative action will create a 
perception that black people are in the position they hold, not because of their hard work, but 
because of compassion reasons.140  In the case of Stoman vs Minister of Safety and Security and 
others,141 the court rejected a milder version of affirmative action whereby affirmative action 
would play the role of a tie breaker when candidates for an appointment have the same 
credentials. This decision seems to imply that because of affirmative action, there will never 
come a time when black people‟s credentials will match up to the standard of white people hence 
the need for perpetual affirmation. In light of such a detrimental implication it is necessary that 
an end to affirmative action is sought before such stereotypes become entrenched. 
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3.3 Failure to adequately advance the masses 
“It would therefore be improper and unfortunate to section 9(2) to be used in circumstances for 
which it was not intended. If used in circumstances where a measure does not in fact advance 
those previously targeted for disadvantage, the effect will be to render Constitutionally compliant, 
a measure which has the potential to discriminate unfairly. This cannot be what section 9(2) 
envisages.”142 
A legal provision‟s failure to fulfill its primary objective renders it obsolete and compels its 
abrogation. The court has interpreted affirmative action and established that its legitimacy is 
drawn from its ability to advance those disadvantaged by previous discrimination. 143  It is 
submitted that affirmative action has not resulted in the advancement of the majority of the 
persons it was supposed to advance. The Quarterly Labour Force Survey for the second quarter 
of 2013 estimates that the unemployment rate of Africans is 29.1 %, Coloureds 25.1 %, Indians 
13.4% yet unemployment of the White race stands at 6.1 %.144 Before the implementation of 
affirmative action the statistics reflected population unemployment rate as follows: Africans 
37%; Coloureds 23 %; Indians 13% and Whites 6 %. 145   Such disparity remains despite 
affirmative action being in place since 1998. It is suggested that the South African economy is 
becoming more capital and less labour intensive.146 This in turn creates the need for skilled 
workers. What worsens the situation is that many individuals lack relevant skills for the 
effectiveness of preferential hiring. This goes to show the inadequacy of preferential hiring or 
promotion to address the present day inequalities.  
Affirmative action has failed to secure access to better paying jobs. Access to such is not only for 
prestigious reasons but is vital for the alleviation of poverty. This is so because a better paying 
job means one can afford and have access to essential amenities of life. The 13th Commission of 
the Employment Equity Annual Report147 indicates that white people continue to dominate top 
management (73 %) whereas they only make up 11.3% of the economically active population. 
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On the other hand Africans constitute 12.3%, Coloureds 4.6% and Indians 7.3% of the top 
management. Commenting on the South Africa Survey, published by the South African Institute 
of Race Relations, Alexander states that “median wages of white earners are four times as high 
as those of African earners”.148 These statistics reflect the continuation of exclusion of blacks 
from high salaried jobs despite having had affirmative action in place for so long. Therefore 
affirmative action has failed to advance disadvantaged persons who remain below the poverty 
datum line. 
Inefficiency of affirmative action can also be drawn from the slow progress it has made so far. 
Trends of its progress have been dubbed the “drunkard/random” movement by the 13th 
Commission Employment Equity Annual Report.149 Such a term has arisen from the movement 
of progress which has been back and forth while making small strides.150 From 2002 to 2004 a 
mere 1.8% change for Africans was noticed in the top management position representivity.151 
From 2006 to 2008 the change was still small and changed by 2.3%.152 A dramatic drop was 
noticed from the year 2008 to 2010 in top management with representation dropping from 13.6 
to 12.7 %. 153 The figure further dropped in 2012 where it fell from 12.7 to 12.3 percent.154 Thus 
although there are few Africans in the top management their numbers continue to drop despite 
the implementation of affirmative action.  
Furthermore, the achievements of affirmative action have benefited a few middle class persons 
from the designated groups. 155 The prime targets of the program have not benefited from the 
promotions and hiring that come with affirmative action.156 What has actually occurred is that 
those who were already better off have amassed benefits at the expense of those who have been 
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prejudiced by the effects of discrimination and require advancement.157 In the end a new class of 
black elite has emerged and the poverty gap has increased amongst persons of the same group.158 
Dupper and Garbers rely upon Gini coefficient figures to show intra racial inequalities. The 
figures reflect the following: Africans 0.62, Coloureds 0.54; Indians 0.61; Whites 0.50.159 These 
figures reflect that Africans have the widest intra racial gap and it is held that the gap increased 
significantly in the period after apartheid, which is the period in which affirmative action was 
vigorously applied.160   This situation challenges the validity of Moseneke J‟s assertion that 
windfall beneficiaries do not affect the validity of the scheme. 161  The presence of windfall 
beneficiaries has created another problem in trying to resolve one. A new path of inequality, 
namely, among persons of the same group and races has emerged. 
  
3.4 The problem in the standard of equity 
It is submitted that the measurement of equitable representation as it is applied today is 
erroneous. The term equitable representation has been taken to mean that a population group‟s 
economically active population should be similarly reflected in the workplace demographics. 
Thus, if Whites constitutes 11% of the economically active population, they are taken to be over 
represented if their presence in management exceeds a ratio equivalent to 11%. Even though this 
makes sense verbally, it has been proved to be problematic and untenable.162 It is untenable 
because to hold that workplace demographics must mirror national demographics is to assume 
that people have the same aspirations. Racial groups consist of people with common 
characteristics but such common attributes are not fixed, there exists differences as well.163 This 
difference in interests results in people choosing different professions. Even if the percentage of 
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economically active blacks is 73 % it is unlikely that 73 % of its population wants to be in the 
management. Such an approach to the remedial measures fails to accommodate the existence of 
diversity among different people.  
More so, affirmative action is aimed at promoting employment of previously disadvantaged 
groups.164Even if the number by which Whites are overrepresented in the top management is 
scaled down,165 a huge number of Blacks would still remain unemployed, not to mention unable 
to occupy top management positions.166 This goes to discredit the assumption behind affirmative 
action, namely, that replacing Whites in top positions with Blacks will advance the majority of 
disadvantaged persons. The Solidarity Institute reports that scaling down of whites in top 
management opens up 28 097 positions which is a meager figure when the reality is that seven 
million people remain unemployed.167 This argument demonstrates how it is trivial to work 
against white ratio as a target for equity. By focusing on the few positions, which are taking time 
to realize, affirmative action has unfortunately taken attention off matters of substance namely 
employment of many. It is submitted that there needs to be a strategy which seeks to achieve the 
advancement of the disadvantaged majority and not just a few persons. Clearly the standard of 
affirmative action namely matching of national demographics with workforce demographics is a 
problematic standard. 
Matching workplace demographics with national population group structures is also problematic 
because national demographics are a moving target. Mushariwa proposes that affirmative action 
should be put aside once workplace targets are reached in specific individual enterprises.168 On 
the face of it such a proposition seems to offer a clear and simple answer. However, such an 
assertion does not go far because it does not take into account the fact that national demographics 
are not fixed. This in turn will mean that upon every such change affirmative action will have to 
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be activated.169 Such an approach goes against the temporary nature of affirmative action as 
explained earlier on.  
The problem does not end there. There are instances whereby national demographics of the 
economically active group do not tally with regional demographics of the economically active 
persons. For example, it is common knowledge that the coloured population is denser in the 
Western Cape than anywhere else in the country. Thus, designing a plan in accordance with 
national demographics would prejudice the Coloured group in the Western Cape Province. To 
this end, in Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and others170  it was 
held that an equity plan was discriminatory for failure to take account of regional 
demographics.171 The court held that regard to regional demographics would serve to assert 
rights of all persons designated as black.172 The court, however, added that there is a need to 
feature national demographics in all considerations because such an approach will tip the scales 
for Africans who suffered the most under apartheid.173 Such ranking is what the Labour Court 
castigated in Naidoo vs Minister of Safety and Security where it was held that numerical targets 
should not have such effect to create rank of preference which does not exist in the 
statutes.174Section 42 of the EEA provides for factors which are to be considered by the Director 
General when assessing whether an employer is complying with the EEA. The factors include 
regional and national demographics of the economically active group. In Munsamy vs The 
Minister of Safety and Security175 the respondent had relied on the demographics of the general 
population and not the specific economically active group as required under section 42 of the 
EEA. The effect was that non designated employees had more posts whilst designated members 
had few with some being excluded, which the court found irrational. 
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3.5 The plight of individual rights 
The implementation of affirmative action disregards individual rights. It has been held that 
remedial goals take primacy over individual rights.176 Moseneke J ruled in Van Heerden that the 
prejudice incurred by persons from non-designated groups during the application of affirmative 
action does not warrant the invalidation of affirmative action. 177  It is an unavoidable 
consequence of affirmative action that, upon its implementation, non-designated group members 
may have to be excluded from a benefit.178 The benefit can be in the form of a job or a promotion 
opportunity or a pension scheme to mention a few. Such pejorative consequences have been 
justified by the court on the basis of the aim it seeks to achieve, namely attaining an equal 
society.179 In other words, teleological reasoning has been the basis upon which the measure has 
been sustained. This dissertation argues that the exclusive justification of affirmative action on 
teleological reasoning does not accord with the constitutional ethos of  an egalitarian society nor 
does it sustain the assertion that affirmative action is not an exception to equality. Affirmative 
action has been held not be an exception to the right to equality but an integral part thereto.180 
Such a holding is not consistent with the way individual rights have been flouted in the name of 
redress.181 This has been so despite the judgment in the case of Coetzer & others v Minister of 
Safety and Security & another182which held that the realisation of equity ought to be done in a 
manner that does not  disregard the dignity of those who do not belong to the non-designated 
groups.183 The refusal by courts to test affirmative action against the standard of fairness has left 
members of non designated groups at the mercy of equity plans without regard to their individual 
rights.184  
The over-inclusiveness that is inherent in affirmative action results in persons similarly 
positioned being unfairly differentiated. In the designated groups, there are individuals who were 
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not prejudiced by past discrimination or who remain privileged even if discriminated.185 Even 
though affirmative action was not primarily meant for such people,186 the policy includes such as  
beneficiaries. Such over inclusiveness is facilitated by the extension of beneficiaries from 
“persons” to “categories of persons” in the Constitution.187 In Van Heerden, the creation of the 
new pension fund resulted in some who had not been prejudiced by past discrimination being 
included as beneficiaries. 188  This had the consequence that, even though the “windfall 
beneficiaries” 189  were similarly positioned with the disfavoured, these two were unfairly 
differentiated.  
 
 The use of rationality as a standard of scrutiny for affirmative action fails to integrate conflicting 
legitimate values. Rationality is an inquiry into the logical relation of a measure to its 
objective.190 The test requires that the measure must be causally linked to its objective.191 The 
standard of rationality precludes a court from enquiring into whether the measure taken by the 
government could have been done in a less onerous way.192 The reasoning behind such a non-
exacting standard has been to allow „significant measure of latitude to the government‟.193 
However this dissertation agrees with Ford and contends that  
“Where the government itself steps in to undertake a departure from the status quo as a matter of 
social policy, we require that its justifications rise to a particularly high standard. [This remains 
so] even though the weight of our scarred racial history may be invoked in order to justify such 
policies”. 194 
Thus it is argued that there is need for a new redress measure which protects the politically 
vulnerable group. 
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Courts have also been hesitant to readily condone affirmative action merely for its purpose.195 
The central premise in Van Heerden, 196  namely that affirmative action should not to be treated 
as prima facie discriminatory is not always adhered to. 197  This serves to show courts‟ 
acknowledgement of the detriment brought about by such an approach. If the correct standard of 
assessment is applied to affirmative action cases a few cases will barely pass constitutional 
muster. What then becomes apparent is that the policy has been a source of equity infringements 
and this calls for a reconsideration of redress measures implemented. 
 
3.6 Racial tension 
The effect of a measure on society can be used to determine whether it is desirable to continue 
implementing that measure.198 Affirmative action has been interpreted in such a way that groups 
previously disadvantaged have been ranked. 199  It has been held that groups that have been 
previously disadvantaged do not benefit equally from affirmative action. 200  The reasoning 
behind such rulings has been that since apartheid had racial hierarchies, to deny that would be an 
undue disregard of the suffering experienced by different groups. Justice Sachs in Van 
Heerden201  held that differentiation among members of the designated groups requires that 
social, historical and legal evidence be led before the court can depart from according similar 
treatment to members of designated groups.202 Save for Motala vs University of Natal,203 practice 
has been that, it is accepted as a given that Africans suffered more than any other designated 
group. Consequently the perception that affirmative action is for the benefit of Africans has been 
strengthened. Nuff and Dupper hold that such an approach creates tension among members of 
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different designated groups.204 In Naidoo it was held that such a practice “creates a perverse 
competition within the designated group on the basis of their race”.205 In all, social cohesion has 
been deeply fractured by such practices emanating from affirmative action. 
Racial targets which come with affirmative action have led to resentment between races. Section 
15(3) of the Employment Equity Act permits the setting of numerical goals when applying 
affirmative action.206 In Naidoo vs Minister of Safety and Security,207 the applicant‟s case was 
that an insurmountable barrier had been placed through the calculation of numerical targets by 
her employer. The targets were such that prospects of promotion for Indian women were reduced 
to a fraction. The court condemned the way the numerical targets had been set on the basis that 
they had an exclusionary effect.208 In a related case of Munsamy v The Minister of Safety and 
Security,209 an Indian male was overlooked in a promotion opportunity because his race was 
considered overrepresented. Again, the numerical targets were such that Indian males had to 
migrate to other provinces for promotion to be possible. 210  The court held that the targets 
constituted a quota system. Whitcher AJ drew the difference between quotas and numerical goals 
by holding that “the imposition of a strict quota is a rigid measure requiring a certain fixed 
proportion or percentage to be included whereas preferential treatment and goals is more flexible 
allowing the achievement of objectives over a period of time”.211The targets were condemned for 
being based on general population demographics instead of the economically active population 
demographics.212  The effect of such a plan was that a non designated group would have more 
posts than a designated one. It was further found that the targets had not been set after a proper 
consultation as required by the EEA.213  As was in Naidoo, the court found that the equity plan 
was not rational based on these procedural errors in the adoption of the plans. The decisions, 
however, fail to dispel the limiting effect of numerical targets in cases where the employer has 
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followed the procedure in the EEA. In many cases, a non-designated group member‟s right to 
choose a trade214 or excel in it has been met with a ceiling of numerical goals.215  This has been 
common practice in instances where a racial group is considered overrepresented.216Courts have 
attempted to distinguish numerical goals from quotas217 but the difference has failed to take away 
reservation of opportunities which translate into a ceiling to advancement.  
“It would be myopic to deny that immense weight is given to race in situations where certain 
positions or places are expressly set aside. On that basis, membership in a „designated group‟ is 
not only a tie-breaking factor when two candidates are equally qualified, but is a consideration 
that may even outweigh other qualifications, provided the person in question has, in the view of 
the employer, the potential to „grow‟ into the job within what is seen to be a reasonable period of 
time”.218  
When a numerical target is set, race will be decisive even though merit is considered.219 Race is 
elevated to the inherent requirement of the job.220 The injustice mirrors the way people were 
marginalized during the apartheid era. Racial categories were used to attach grave consequences 
despite the individual‟s circumstances. The practice has left „a number of better qualified 
dispreferreds with the distinct feeling of having been wronged‟. 221  Herman 222  argues that 
„affirmative action is not only the attrition of white employees but a blockade on new whites who 
want to enter high positions in employment as they face quotas or numerical goals‟.223  A 
combination of these young whites and all those denied promotion on account of race creates an 
appreciable number of persons who resent the other group to whom they lost the promotion to.224  
In the end, it becomes apparent that the remedial measure needs to be revised. 
Continuation with the use of race, entrenches racial consciousness. It is acknowledged that race 
was used as a criterion to deprive during apartheid and that amelioration should follow the same 
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fault-line so as to rectify the damage that was done.225 However, it is submitted that continuation 
with this approach reinforces racism. The indefinite reference to race in policy and legislation, 
bolsters instead of eradicates people‟s understanding of relationship in terms of race.226 This is 
incompatible with a state coming from a history of racial oppression and trying to move beyond 
it.  
3.7 Inconsistency in the approach by the courts 
Disjunctive precedence characterised by affirmative action jurisprudence is evidence enough to 
show that affirmative action does not bode well in the prescripts of justice. The decisions of the 
court have been in discord concerning similar principles relating to affirmative action. This alone 
motivates the phasing out of affirmative action in the workplace if legal certainty is to be 
restored in our courts. 
The most crucial issue is the standard of scrutiny that applies to affirmative action. Moseneke J 
held that rationality is the standard that applies when reviewing affirmative action measures.227 
Judge Mokgoro disagreed and asserted that affirmative action ought to be subject to the test in 
section 9(3) of the Constitution.228 A previous court had held that the absence of fairness would 
greatly undermine the dignity of those not considered as beneficiaries.229 Although Moseneke J 
wrote for the Constitutional Court, Labour Court decisions that followed did not follow such 
assertion.230 Such a deep split has served to emphasise the incompatibility of affirmative action 
with legality. 
Related to the above is the question of value of an equity plan. A principle adopted in many 
decisions is that once an equity plan has been properly adopted it is beyond scrutiny.231  Sections 
13 to 20 of the EEA provide for the procedure to be followed when implementing affirmative 
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action. In the case of Coetzer and others vs Minister of Safety and Security and another232 it was 
held that leaving positions vacant in instances whereby suitable candidates from designated 
groups could not be found is unconstitutional. In Barnard,233 the SAPS Commissioner‟s choice 
to leave posts vacant after failing to find suitably qualified candidates from the designated group 
was also in contest. The Commissioner had refused the appointment of Barnard on the grounds 
that such appointment would not address representivity for which the post had been created. 
Furthermore, the Commissioner was of the opinion that the post could be left vacant because it 
was not critical and would not affect service delivery. The Labour Court found that such a 
decision although made for remedial purposes was unconstitutional. It held that the applicant had 
been overlooked in a manner which disregarded her dignity and right to equality. The 
Commissioner had found it better to leave the post vacant (twice) than appoint a white woman. 
The Court was of the opinion that redress measures should not be applied rigidly but must be 
balanced with the individual‟s right to equality. The decision was reversed on appeal in the 
Labour Appeal Court.234 The Labour Appeal Court held that the decision to overlook Barnard 
had been made in terms of a properly drafted employment equity plan and therefore justified. It 
was held that the plan was rational because it identified gaps and set timed measures to address 
such disparities and that it did not just seek appointment of blacks but of suitably qualified 
blacks. It further held that regard to individual rights would defeat the constitutional purpose of 
redress because affirmative action would always have an adverse effect on the previously 
advantaged individuals. 235  The Labour Appeal Court reasoned that an equity plan is a 
constitutionally mandated tool to remove inequalities of the past and as long as it had been 
drafted in accordance with the EEA, its implementation was rational and not reviewable. 
 The Labour Appeal Court‟s reasoning seems to follow the precedent laid in Van Heerden. The 
Van Heerden three prong test establishes that an affirmative action measure need only comply 
with the   rationality standard for Constitutional consonance. The Appeal Court‟s decision has 
been taken further on appeal and a different decision will add uncertainty to the already 
disjunctive precedent. 
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Meanwhile, there are two more judgments that were delivered after the Labour Appeal Court‟s 
decision. These two judgments explicitly departed from the rigid implementation of equity plans. 
In the case of Naidoo,236 an affirmative action plan was implemented such that the employment 
chances of Indian women were removed. The Labour Court ruled that such an exclusionary 
effect represented a quota and therefore unfair. This approach went against what the Labour 
Appeal Court in Barnard had ruled to be beyond judicial scrutiny. The court‟s interpretation in 
Naidoo called for an approach closely related to that of the Labour Court in Barnard. It called for 
a situation sensitive approach which took into account the effect of the impugned affirmative 
action measure. 
However, in Munsamy the court refused to decide whether an affirmative action measure can be 
challenged if it did not result in representivity as alleged. The case concerned a challenge to an 
equity plan which was ruled invalid for not being a product of consultation and in accordance 
with the required demographics. The plan was also unlawful for establishing a quota. However, 
what is of interest is the fact that the Court refused to decide on the fact that the plan should be 
challenged on the basis that even if it had been implemented in line with the procedure laid in the 
EEA, it did not result in a representative outcome because the station was mostly constituted 
with Africans. The Court held that it was debatable if it could decide on such issues.  This again 
was a setback to the issue of status of an equity plan.  
Another inconsistency regards eligibility criteria. Disadvantage as a result of past discrimination 
need not be proven individually. In other words, the court has accepted holding disadvantage 
synonymously with race. Surprisingly foreign nationals have been ruled not to qualify because 
they did not personally suffer from past discrimination. 237  The court decided to revert to 
considering personal prejudice as a criterion of eligibility yet it is the same criterion that has been 
held not to apply in determining the eligibility for affirmative action.238 It is submitted that the 
court‟s reasoning is justified on the basis that it took a contextual and purposive approach.239 
Purposive interpretation reasons that affirmative action was enacted to ameliorate representation 
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in the workplace.240 However, it is contended that inclusion of foreigners would have had the 
same effect. This is so in that proponents of affirmative action have asserted that it is also the 
purpose of affirmative action to put black people into positions so that they work as role models 
to aspirants of different work occupation. It is bemoaned that such considerations were not taken 
into account in coming to the decision in Auf der Hyde. 241  Such inconsistencies not only 
undermine justice but go against legal certainty. 
It also remains unclear what ought to happen after equity targets have been reached. In UNISA v 
Reynhardt,242  the Labour Appeal Court held that an affirmative action appointment would be 
impermissible when equity targets have been reached. Again, this was in sharp contrast with the 
opinion of the Murphy J in Alexandre v Provincial Administration of the Western Cape 
Department of Health,243  who expressed doubt whether the fact that equity targets have been 
met calls for an end to preferential treatment for remedial purposes.244 Again it remains unclear 
whether affirmative action ends with the reaching of equity targets. 
 
Of concern as well is the issue of how affirmative action should be enforced. Courts have 
emerged divided in deciding whether an employee can institute a claim against an employer for 
failure to implement affirmative action.  In Harmse v City of Cape Town 245 and in Dudley vs 
City of Cape Town & another, 246  the court was approached by applicants claiming an 
infringement of the right to preferential treatment after having been overlooked in a promotion 
selection. In Harmse 247 it was held that an employee has a right to preferential treatment and can 
sue for the employer‟s failure to implement an equity plan. On the other hand, in Dudley, it was 
held that enforcement of equity plans is left to the Director General not the individual employee. 
In Harmse v City of Cape Town, Waglay J reasoned that affirmative action obliges an employer 
to take pro-active steps in the elimination of discrimination and promotion of diversity. Thus, if 
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an employer failed to take such measures, it amounted to unfair discrimination against 
designated employees. On that basis he reasoned that Harmse had a cause of action against the 
employer. On the other hand, Tip AJ in Dudley, held that discrimination in chapter II of the EEA 
is different from the consultation process of chapter III of the EEA. He held that chapter III 
enforcement provisions were left to the Director General for enforcement whereas chapter II 
discrimination claims are for the courts to enforce. It was concluded that the two claims, namely 
discrimination and enforcement claims, are separate and are to be enforced separately. Again, the 
same question of law brought about two conflicting answers. In Harmse, it was held that a 
designated employee can approach the court citing unfair discrimination where an employer has 
failed to promote or appoint him in accordance with affirmative action. In Dudley, it was held 
that such a claim is for the Director General to enforce and not the individual employee. 
Attention is drawn to the conflicts that are inherent in the jurisprudence of affirmative action. 
 
 3.8 Economic consequences of the implementation of affirmative action in South Africa 
The motivation to phase out affirmative action does not only come from legal reasons but 
economic reasons as well. The years that have passed have seen the implementation of 
affirmative action in the workplace and it appears that the measure is not economically 
sustainable.  
3.8.1 Brain drain 
The preferential hiring and promoting characteristic of affirmative action has led to the 
movement of skilled labour out of the country.248 Members of the non-designated groups whose 
career expectations have been frustrated have left the country in search of places where they 
have a better chance of career advancement. The brain drain is not restricted to the national level 
but domestic levels too. Disgruntled members of the non-designated group have moved from the 
public sector to join the private sector. Their disgruntlement emanates from the frustration 
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encountered when overlooked for promotion opportunities. Such migration of labour has greatly 
hampered service delivery especially in critical services such as the health sector.249 
3.8.2 Efficiency against diversity 
Affirmative action has compromised service delivery in the public sector. Affirmative action has 
been applied more vigorously in the public sector than the private sector.250 This is reflected in 
the statistics which report that top management of government business constitutes 46.6% 
African males; 6.2% Coloureds; 4.9% Indians and only 11.5% white males.251 Section 20(3) of 
the EEA makes it permissible to prefer persons with less qualifications or experience when 
hiring or promoting provided that they have the capacity to acquire the ability to do the job 
within a reasonable time. 252 This was undertaken in the public sector without regard to a 
minimum threshold of qualifications.253 The result has been poor performance of the public 
sector. In turn rampant strikes against poor service delivery has ensued. Such consequence is a 
manifestation of the argument that affirmative action lowers the threshold level of performance. 
Although other factors contribute to the poor service delivery from the public sector, it is 
reasonable to infer that maladministration caused by incompetence is one of the factors resulting 
in the under performance of the sector.  In 2003 the State admitted that the consequences of 
affirmative action have been „severe and counterproductive‟.254 The private sector moderately 
applies affirmative action and its performance is better than the public sector.255 In the light of 
this reality one therefore can safely agree with Devenish‟s assertion that affirmative action has 
hampered service delivery in the public sector.256 This also amounts to a violation of section 195 
of the Constitution which provides for efficiency in the running of state departments. 
Affirmative action has been extended to sports with similar dire consequences.  Professional 
sports players fall under the ambit of employees as regulated by the Labour Relations Act and by 
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extension the EEA.257  Even though EEA has not been relied on directly in matters of sports, the 
policy trends have been the same.258 Affirmative action in sports has been brought in to eradicate 
discriminatory patterns as well as to enhance the number of people of colour in the teams.259 
However the government‟s obsession with numbers has seen the disregard of the need to field 
the best players for success.260 This is not to say that sportsman brought in through affirmative 
action cannot be the best in sports. Criticism has arisen whereby those in power insist on 
numerical targets even if that would compromise efficiency. Former President Thabo Mbeki was 
quoted as saying “for two to three years let‟s not mind losing international competitions because 
we are bringing our people into these teams”.261  The pursuit of numerical goals is not cogniscent 
of how sport‟s efficiency relies on individual‟s character for viability. Louw states that the only 
reason why sports fans would pay for sports is because when sports are competitive they are 
unpredictable, thrilling and interesting. 262  Thus replacing a talented player whose personal 
attribute and skill draws crowds to the screen and stadiums, flies in the face of what sustains such 
business. Again this is not to say people of colour are not talented. It has occurred that in trying 
to look for the talent expected such persons are not readily available. When this was brought to 
the fore, Mr Majeke in his capacity as manager of the South African Sports Confederation and 
Olympic Committee was quoted as saying “we do not care, they should go and find them in the 
streets of Alexander”.263   Consequently, the South African team‟s poor performance at the 2008 
Beijing Olympics was largely attributed to the insistence of racial numbers in sports teams.264  
Louw then draws attention to how preferential selection in disregard of merit compromises 
business efficiency.265 This is true in situations where a business requires a person who can take 
up a position and perform promptly rather than someone who will need time to adapt. The search 
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for talent has been replaced by the search for racial numbers and the consequences have been 
mostly dire. 
The enforcement of affirmative action can also discourage investment. Foreign investors would 
like to come with their own experts to attend to key performance areas. They are likely to shun 
investing in a country which requires them to put persons other than their own experts in some of 
those areas for representivity purposes. The uncertainty that has characterised affirmative action 
jurisprudence does not make the country attractive to investment. Such uncertainty can make 
stability of the investment environment questionable and consequently discourage investment. 
 
 
3.9 Summation of findings 
From the discussion above, it appears that there is a discordant jurisprudence on affirmative 
action. From such conflict, there exist an established pattern of individual rights trammeled 
under the guise of social redress. The greater good namely, advancement of the disadvantaged, 
for which such violations have been rendered permissible, has not materialized to an appreciable 
extent. This has made the promise of the measure, being temporary, questionable. Affirmative 
action has been linked to economic under performance in the public sector. All in all, such 
challenges have made it doubtful if the retention of affirmative action remains desirable. The 
chapter that follows will take a look into how other jurisdictions have dealt with affirmative 









CHAPTER 4: COMPARATIVE STUDY 
4.1 Outline  
The failure of affirmative action is not unique to South Africa. The conflict of individual rights 
and restitutionary goals has been the subject of controversial debate in the USA. Societal 
imbalances linked to discriminatory practices is also an occurrence found in the USA. It gives 
great cause to explore channels employed to ameliorate such imbalances when one learns that 
one of the methods adopted as a solution is similar to our very own.  The debates arising out of 
such methods and constituting the USA jurisprudence are of immense importance in the 
assessment of the method we have chosen to ameliorate our imbalances. 
The preceding chapter has articulated how affirmative action has failed to advance the 
disadvantaged. It has articulated the problematic nature of affirmative action as it is applied 
today and how it is necessary that affirmative action be phased out. This chapter draws attention 
to how affirmative action has been implemented in the USA and ultimately failed. The chapter 
also highlights how problems with affirmative action in South Africa were also experienced in 
the USA. Ultimately, it is brought to bear that continuation with affirmative action on the 
speculation that it will work, is unlikely to materialize. A contrary view would be that 
circumstances of the compared jurisdictions are different. Such criticism necessitates mentioning 
the extent and respects in which the compared jurisdictions converge. 
4.2 Why choose U.S.A for comparison? 
Firstly, reference to the USA jurisprudence is necessitated by the fact that the concept of written 
constitutionalism originated in the USA. 266The time that has passed with the USA applying the 
concept puts them in a better position to understand how affirmative action is interpreted in light 
of the doctrine of constitutionalism. One of the reasons motivating the phasing out of affirmative 
action is its incompatibility with the Constitution.267 Therefore, the USA jurisprudence would 
provide ways to deal with the contention. 
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Secondly, the length of time which affirmative action has been implemented makes it possible to 
gauge prospects of success against time. The USA has applied affirmative action for 48 years. 
With that length of time, all that could ever become of affirmative action has been experienced in 
the USA. The comparison then dispenses the need to continue with affirmative action in the hope 
that it will succeed with time. The USA has tried it for longer and the measure did not work. 
Thus most of the challenges that come with affirmative action have been considered in U.S.A 
courts. 268 Valuable lessons and reasoning can thus be derived from their judgments. 
The two jurisdictions have a number of factors in common. It is necessary to highlight such 
similarities because it has often been held that the two jurisdictions are not comparable because 
of difference in context and political framework.269 It then becomes incumbent to articulate what 
the U.S.A share in common with South Africa. The two countries have a history of racial 
discrimination which greatly prejudiced designated races. Amongst the discriminated races, both 
countries share the African race as a discriminated population. 270 Thus the struggle for equality 
is a phenomenon shared by both countries. „Although racial discrimination has never been 
official government policy in the USA as in South Africa, it nevertheless is a problem that has 
run equally deep in the US‟.271 Thus legislation framing affirmative action and laws of equality 
are informed by a substantially similar background. Hence it is safe to allude to the U.S.A 
jurisprudence for the purposes of clarity. 
4.3 Origins  
Just like in South Africa, affirmative action in the USA refers to proactive measures that favour 
relatively disadvantaged groups with the object of attaining equality of standard of living.272 The 
inception of affirmative action in the USA jurisprudence was marked by the executive order 
issued by John F Kennedy in 1961 after a long battle of civil rights struggles.273 That same order 
was carried on by Lyndon Johnson in 1965.274 The orders‟ requirements were that all contractors 
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dealing with the federal government who had fifty employees and above or whose contracts were 
valued at fifty thousand dollars and above were to account for the under representation of 
minority members in their employ.275 The contractors were then required to take positive action, 
including drawing of timetables, to ameliorate for disparities in minority representation in their 
work force.276 The order also prohibited racial discrimination, among other grounds, when hiring 
or when making employment decisions. 
Pursuant to the above executive order, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 
promulgated. 277  The Act prohibits inter alia racial discrimination when hiring or providing 
employment privileges. 278  The Act established the Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission to police compliance with the Act.279 The Commission requires periodic reports 
containing the racial demography of the workforce to be submitted to it. In that way 
discrimination and affirmative action can be monitored at a public and private level280 as well as 
voluntarily or involuntarily.281 It was to be implemented at recruitment, promotion, hiring or 
training among other employment activities.282 
4.4 Purpose 
The initial objective of affirmative action in the USA was numerical in nature.283 Programmes 
such as the Philadelphia Plan were aimed at increasing the number of minority members in the 
construction industry.284 
The legal framework providing for affirmative action in the US was aimed at fettering 
discrimination. Black people among other minorities had been exposed to systemic 
discrimination.285 The government took upon itself the mandate to deconstruct racial practices 
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and their effects on the minority of the population. 286  Affirmative action was aimed at the 
advancement of African Americans who had been prejudiced by past discriminatory practices.287 
It sought to put African Americans into position from which they were previously excluded. 
 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was promulgated to guarantee equal opportunity in 
accessing employment.288 It was envisaged to break the cycle of racial preference and exclusion 
of black people from certain jobs.289  There was an over concentration of the white race in 
decision making positions. The policy attempts “to eliminate those discriminatory practices and 
devices that have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority 
citizens”.290  This can entail imposing affirmative action on employers with a reputation of 
discrimination and whom minority employees might not apply to because of such reputation. 
Thus, affirmative action was purported to remove employment barriers built on race and acting 
to the prejudice of African Americans among other races. 
 
4.5 How affirmative action is applied in the United States 
4.5.1 Individual rights against the goal to address societal imbalances 
In the USA, affirmative action has been tested both politically and legally through referendums 
and lawsuits since the 1970s.291  The USA‟s current legal position regarding affirmative action 
reflects more of a formal than substantive equality approach. In the case of Regents of the 
University of California v Bakke,292 it was held 
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“...[i]t is the individual who is entitled to judicial protections against classifications based upon 
his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon personal rights, rather 
than the individual only because of his membership in a particular group”293 
 
Such an approach entails making the governmental goal yield to individual rights.294 It stands in 
sharp contrast with South African Labour Appeal Court position in the case of SAPS vs 
Solidarity obo Barnard. 295  In this case the court stated in no ambiguous terms that the 
governmental goal of attaining equality reigns supreme over individual rights when the two 
considerations are in conflict.296 The effect of the USA approach is such that the governmental 
restitutionary and integrative objectives are greatly hindered. This is so because affirmative 
action always includes a negative impact on an individual.297 One would find that this has been 
the ground upon which affirmative action has been banned in many States in the USA.298 The 
USA approach would not work because it threatens any race conscious initiative to ameliorate 
social disparities.299 On the other hand, the approach of the Labour Appeal Court in Barnard 
does not settle well with the constitutional goal of an egalitarian state. This so because the 
transformational goal does not entail disregarding non-designated group members completely.300 
In the end, one would realize that there is a continuous battle between affirmative action and 
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4.5.2 The strict scrutiny test 
In an attempt to ameliorate the adverse impact of affirmative action and yet secure its 
continuation, Americans apply affirmative action subject to the strict scrutiny test. 301   The 
landmark case establishing the strict scrutiny test was penned by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
for the majority in Adarand Constructors v Pena.302 This decision holds to the present day and 
established that race based programs imposed by the federal government must be applied subject 
to a standard of strict scrutiny. It is however incumbent to mention that this test was introduced 
in 1995 and before then the standard of review was almost similar to that applied in South Africa 
currently. 
 The test requires that an employer, who applies affirmative action, must do so in light of strong 
evidence of the need to remedy effects of past or present discrimination or for a compelling 
governmental interest. 303  In the South African context this would be termed legitimate 
governmental interest.304Such an interest would be the goal which is sought to be achieved.305 In 
both countries‟ courts, it has been widely accepted that the need to redress societal imbalances is 
an imperative issue.306 What remains controversial is the way such objective ought to be attained. 
Thus, the second requirement addresses how the objective is to be achieved. It requires that the 
means used should be narrowly tailored in meeting its objective.307 It serves   to ensure that 
racial preferences do not unduly burden non-designated group members. 308  This approach 
resembles the South African Constitution‟s limitation clause.309 This clause provides that the 
means employed when limiting a right should be one with the least adverse effect.310 Naturally 
this would entail considering alternatives which are less adverse as well as a consideration of the 
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extent of the burden imposed.311  America‟s jurisprudence has promoted this requirement to 
guard against race being used as a sole requirement to access social goods.312 Courts enquire 
„whether race is a factor determining eligibility for a programme or whether race is just one 
factor in the decision making processes‟.313 In elucidating the rationale behind such strictness, it 
has been held that 
 "…even in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve 
to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing 
decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs." 314 
 All in all, it appears that South African courts try to justify the adversity of affirmative action315 
whilst USA courts try to minimise it.316 What becomes clear is that both courts are trying to 
elude the conclusion that experience has shown, namely that affirmative action does not settle 
well with the right to equality. Clearly having an open approach like South Africa entails a 
compromise for the non designated groups members whereas a restricted approach seem not to 
take the objective of redress any further. Thus one can conclude that a time has come to 
reconsider the redress strategy. 
The American approach to affirmative action reflects a departure from the presumption that all 
people in the designated groups are disadvantaged. In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v 
Stotts,317 the Supreme Court followed the victim specificity approach. The Court discredited 
membership to a designated group as a qualification to benefit from affirmative action. The 
aggrieved person has to prove that he was personally prejudiced by past discriminatory 
practice.318 The South African approach does not require proof of personal disadvantage on the 
basis that it is difficult to calculate degrees of disadvantage.319  Courts have reasoned that focus 
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should rather be on the objective of the policy.320 The requirement to show individual prejudice 
on the basis of race has also been criticised for being “retrospective in orientation, rather than 
prospective”.321  Thus it has been rejected for failure to advance the objective of reconciliation. 
Unlike the South African context, affirmative action in the U.S.A is applied to facilitate equality 
of opportunity. 322  In United Steelworkers of America vs Weber, 323  the majority held that 
affirmative action entails equality of opportunity.324  The approach is such that if it is possible to 
adopt a race neutral remedy to cure a race-based problem, anything else other than that does not 
pass the strict scrutiny test. South African law reflects an approach bent on equal distribution of 
resources. Resources are transferred to individuals based upon ascribed immutable 
characteristics and this is justified on the basis of objective. In Barnard,325 the Labour Appeal 
Court condoned that a position would rather be left vacant if a person of colour is not found than 
give it to a non-designated group member. The effect of this approach is such that similarly 
motivated individuals cannot compete on an equal footing because of race.  
 
Legal action can be brought against an employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.326 Upon an allegation and finding of discriminatory patterns, a court can decree affirmative 
action in a way it deems fit to interrupt such patterns.327 A court can even make a punitive order 
against an employer whom it finds applying discriminatory practices. An employment pattern is 
regarded as having a disparate impact if “the selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group is 
less than four-fifths of the rate for the group with the highest rate”.328 The problem with this 
approach is that numbers are not always reflective of equality of opportunity. An Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission329 „auditor can observe the rate at which minorities are 
hired in the various firms, but not the employers‟ inclination to discriminate or the characteristics 
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of the applicants‟.330 Thus the institutional deconstruction which the policy of affirmative action 
seeks to address is elusive to the policy. The fact that discrimination still persists goes to show 
the inadequacy of the policy to attain its goal. 
4.6 Success rate of affirmative action   
Having established that the U.S.A has a different approach in the way it applies affirmative 
action, a look at its success rate would motivate whether a different approach is what is needed in 
the South African context or abandonment of the policy in employment law. What follows is an 
analysis of empirical research reports dating back from the early periods of affirmative action in 
the U.S.A. so that the effect of affirmative action can be assessed both when it had an approach 
similar to South Africa and when its approach became stricter. 
4.7 Effect of affirmative action on enterprises 
Holzer and Neumark report from an empirical survey and submit that affirmative action leads to 
the hiring of less-qualified workers from groups of minority workers.331  Griffin,332 using data of 
imputed wages from population census, also came to the conclusion that contractors applying 
affirmative action end up with high costs of production.333Holzer and Neumark concede that the 
application of affirmative action when hiring probably leads to higher costs, because minorities 
hired with less qualifications would need extra help to adapt to the job requirements.334 They also 
state that administration costs for compliance with affirmative action are also high.335 They go on 
to say the cost on resources is even higher in the public sector.336 The conclusion therefore 
becomes obvious that continuation with affirmative action would be adverse to the profitability 
of business. 
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However, Holzer and Neumark try to trivialize such effect by postulating that „the costs that 
employers bear as a result of affirmative action in hiring are likely to be a one-time cost 
associated with bringing skills up to speed.337 However, considering that labour is a mobile 
commodity, such a submission is rendered inapt. Job skipping can necessitate the application of 
affirmative action repeatedly and a corresponding cost is incurred repeatedly as well. This 
substantiates remarks by Fraser338 whereby she alleges that affirmative action measures need to 
be repeated again and again. Her conclusion is based on the premise that affirmative action 
addresses effects of discrimination without deconstructing the underlying structures that generate 
them. 
 
4.8 Distributive effects of affirmative action 
Neumark and Holzer attribute the growth of minority employment from (1960 to 1995) to 
affirmative action339 but this omits to mention that there was a growing trend already. A close 
analysis by Jones reveals that this is erroneous. 340  Jones illuminates this error by figures which 
show that even before the inception of affirmative action, employment of the minorities was 
already on the rise (though slow). The 87% figure of black families living below the poverty line 
in 1940 went down to 47 % by 1960.341 It went down further to 30 % in 1970.342  Such figures 
serve to rebut the assertion that affirmative action resulted in the growth of employment rate for 
minorities in the U.S.A.  
If one is to reflect what the situation was 28 years after the inception of affirmative action, it 
appears that progress in redistribution was a disappointment. 343  In 1995, 97% of senior 
management positions were held by individuals of the white race.344 This was so despite them 
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constituting only 78.8% of the workforce.345 On the other hand African Americans constituted 
10% of the workforce but only held 2.5% of the senior management positions. 
The 2013 statistics released by the Bureau of Labour Statistics US Department of Labour 
indicate that overall unemployment sits at 7.3%.346 It disheartening to note that unemployment 
rate of Blacks exceeds this percentage and is recorded as 13.0% whereas Whites‟ unemployment 
rate is only 6.4%.347 These disparities continue despite the continued application of affirmative 
action. 
 
Scholars both against and in support of affirmative action concur that despite the implementation 
of affirmative action in the U.S.A, its objectives have not been realized. J.S Leonard reported 
that the process studies by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR), the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), and the House and Senate Committees on Labour and Public Welfare 
all conclude that affirmative action has been ineffective.348  In 2004 McGregor lamented that 
despite affirmative action having been in place for quite a time, prejudice and covert 
discrimination against African-Americans continue.349 Using audit studies, wage regression tests 
and employer characteristics and behaviour among other approaches to test for race 
discrimination in the labour market, Neumark and Holzer conclude that discrimination still 
continues. 350   They lament the redistributive efficacy of affirmative action saying the 
redistribution of earnings from white men to minorities is not likely to be very large.351 They are, 
however, of the opinion that such setbacks are offset by gains experienced by minorities and 
women who enter the labour market with known disadvantages and who often face 
discrimination there in the absence of these forces.352 Despite being hopeful such assertions do 
not take away affirmative action‟s failure to redress imbalances created by past discrimination 
despite being in force for so long. 
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4.9 Summation  
 The discussion above explored the legal position of U.S.A in terms of affirmative action. It has 
established that the U.S.A‟s initial approach to affirmative action was similar to the present 
South African approach. As time went by the application of the policy became stringent and 
ultimately got banned in 13 states including Michigan. However, the implementation of 
affirmative action has never reached a success rate which compels eradication by consummation 
of intention. Both South African and American courts grapple with the conflict between 
individual rights and the governmental aim to redress the society‟s inequalities. Discrimination 
and its effects continue to thrive in both South African and American workplace. This is so 
despite the U.S.A having fine-tuned its approach of affirmative action by qualifying it with the 
strict scrutiny test. Thus one can see clearly that affirmative action is an inadequate method of 
social redress. In summation affirmative action has outlived its tenure on the grounds elucidated 
above namely, its contention with individual rights, failure to redress imbalance and its adverse 













Chapter 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Recommendations 
Having advanced arguments which support the phasing out of affirmative action in the 
workplace, the following recommendations serve to provide the way forward. 
 
Any proposal of reform should be able to cater for the polarized interests of an unequal society 
such as South Africa today. It is also appreciated that the way forward should provide means 
which do not replicate the problems which have necessitated the phasing out of affirmative 
action in the first place. Moreover, economic sustainability of any measure should not escape 
consideration. The major criticism leveled against affirmative action is that it addresses the end 
result without dealing with the structures giving rise to the problem. 353  The way forward 
therefore is a solution that is sensitive to the rights of all, economically sustainable, curbs the 
underlying structures giving rise to inequality and offers long lasting amelioration to the 
problem. 
5.2 Education and skills development 
The first recommendation goes to addresses the structures that generate inequality in the 
workplace. West avers that affirmative action is neither a major solution to poverty nor a 
sufficient means to equality. 354  Thus, as the Labour Market Commission suggested, it is 
incumbent that focus be shifted to extra-market factors that perpetuate unequal opportunities.355 
It is common cause that the hiring or promotion of workers is based on formal qualifications 
among other considerations. It is therefore necessary that persons coming from disadvantaged 
backgrounds acquire these qualifications. The solution therefore calls for the prioritization of 
educating those who are excluded from the labour market for lack of these qualifications.  
Education can take two forms, namely academic education and skills development. Both of these 
make for the qualifications of a worker. The importance of academic education lies in it being 
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the foundation upon which skills development takes place. Thus it is necessary that efforts of 
improvement be channeled to schools, most importantly primary schools. It is a common feature 
that persons from disadvantaged schools are limited in terms of their careers whereas those 
coming from private schools excel.356 This usually occurs because public schools which are 
government sponsored are poorly managed and under resourced. It is therefore recommended 
that government efforts and the corporate world channel funds towards public schools so that 
they are well resourced and can provide the essentials necessary for the grooming of  human 
capital in its infancy. The same goes for high schools and universities. Funds need to be 
channeled towards scholarships, bursaries and even loans. This is not to say that nothing of this 
nature has been done. What is of essence is that it has not been enough to strengthen a wide and 
rich pool of human capital. Trends are that private schools and former white universities 
continue to rank high so that a candidate educated from public\government institutions is looked 
down upon during the job seeking period. Thus efforts should not end only at putting people into 
schools but also at improving the quality of services offered by these schools.357 
Skills development refers to the processes of practical learnership. There appears to be a 
symbiotic cause and effect trend in the way persons are recruited. The group with the highest rate 
of skills development has the highest recruitment rates. Statistics produced by the 13th 
Commission Employment Equity Annual Report of 2013 show that the white race has the 
highest proportion of people undergoing skills development, with a percentage of 34.5. 358  This 
corresponds with a high recruitment rate for Whites which stand at 42.6% at management level. 
The skills development rate of Africans was estimated to stand at 16.8%, Coloured 5.6 percent 
and Indians 7.1%. Consequently these low percentages in skills development correspond with a 
low recruitment rate.359 Thus the recruitment rate of African males stood at 12.7 %, Coloured 
males 4 % and Indian males 6.7%. A similar pattern is also apparent in the top management; 
skills development rates correspond with the recruitment rates. It is therefore concluded that 
efforts should be made to put disadvantaged people through skills development. This can be 
done through awareness campaigns, offering incentives to motivate people and subsidizing fees 
for attending such institutions.  
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Skills development and education is necessary not only to gain employment but also to ensure 
that people put in positions of influence are persons who can respond „flexibly to rapid economic 
and technological change‟.360  It does not do any good to employ or promote to people with low 
credentials. Such practices have brought governmental service delivery into 
disrepute.361Therefore, it is essential that persons chosen for such positions receive adequate 
training. Education and skills development is the only way to ensure that those who occupy these 
positions can participate meaningfully. This would avoid a situation whereby dummy positions 
are created just to satisfy representivity (tokenism) as in the case of Barnard.362. 
Affirmative action was envisaged to create equality of opportunity; the acquisition of skills 
would give meaning to this goal by capacitating individuals. Thus, educating people would 
enable them to enjoy all rights and freedoms fully as envisaged in section 9 of the Constitution. 
As highlighted in chapter two, there are instances in which employers have opted to leave 
positions vacant because suitable candidates from designated groups could not be found.363 It is 
therefore argued that previously disadvantaged group members need to be trained to qualify for 
relevant vacancies.  
 
Another reason why skills development is recommended as the way to ameliorate disparity is 
that affirmative action in its current form has contributed to racial tension. Affirmative action is 
not being applied in a vacuum. It involves persons being prejudiced on account of their race and 
as argued in chapter two, this has created racial tension. Although no program would be without 
shortcomings that cause complaints, education would be met with less resistance than affirmative 
action in the employment sector.364 
The above recommendation is likely to be met with a counter argument that even skill 
acquisition involves race as well. Thus, it is recommended that the criteria for eligibility for 
assistance with education and skills development assistance would have to shift from race to 
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financial status. This is necessitated by the argument in the previous chapters that disadvantage 
has shifted and no longer follows a racial axis. Assumed group characteristics need to be revised.  
In this way persons who are really in need of assistance will receive assistance.365 In the past this 
proposition has been criticised on the basis that it is too difficult to ascertain the economic status 
of an individual.366 It was further assumed that such a move would upset social coherence in that 
one would have to constantly refer to the past to prove that one is a victim. 367  However, 
America368 and India have done so without such assumptions materialising and South Africa can 
surely follow suit. This development serves to affirm that affirmative action is not a 
compensation programme but a measure to redress societal imbalances. 
 
5.3 Proxy positions 
It is recognised that experience is one of the requirements for job eligibility and that academic 
qualification is not enough. Therefore, it is proposed that positions which mimic the top 
executives should be created with an intention of creating a pool of candidates with experience. 
In this way, those with academic qualifications only are exposed to experience without having to 
occupy the actual positions. Mobility to high positions would be a smooth transition because of 
the experience obtained and such persons would be preferable since they would have acquired 
work ethic during that period. In the end those who get promoted do not compromise service 
delivery. All in all, the recommendation goes to capacitating people through the acquisition of 
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 Section 631 of  the Small Business Act 102 of 1996 has included economically disadvantaged individuals 
amongst those who are eligible for state aid interventions; the criteria  for determining economic indigence is set 
out in section 124 of the Small Business Act.  
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5.4 Job Creation 
Job creation also remains one of the most effective ways to improve representivity. It has been 
shown in chapter 2 that even if the percentage by which whites are overrepresented is scaled 
down, there still remain a large number of people without employment. This therefore points to 
the need for additional jobs to cater for those who are unemployed.369  The years in which 
affirmative action has been in implementation have shown that waiting on preferential treatment 
when jobs arise has not helped advance people as expected.370 Thus, to ensure that persons 
excluded from the labour market and those who wish to excel are catered for, employment 
creation is necessary. 
Job creation can take the form of training lay off schemes. Such schemes entail „skills training 
and an allowance to employees during a negotiated layoff period‟.371 This solution also goes to 
address skills development and short term relief to the unemployed.372 In addition it is also 
recommended that employment subsidy for new recruits and learnerships be resorted to.373  
Parliament has adopted the Employment Tax Incentive Bill which will come into effect in 
January 2014.This is a government scheme which encourages employers to hire youths between 
the age of 18 and 29. All employers registered to pay employees‟ tax to South Africa Revenue 
Authority Services will receive a deduction on the tax if they hire youths. The incentive 
ameliorates the risk and costs of hiring inexperienced persons or first time employment seeker.374 
It serves the additional advantage of exposing the unemployed and inexperienced to an 
opportunity of gaining experience as well as employment opportunities. 
It is also appreciated that job creation is made possible through investment.  State policies 
determine how much investment a state will attract. It is therefore imperative that economic and 
political policies are investor friendly. Such a solution lies in the ambit of government and it is 
recommended that government engage with stake-holders and potential stake holders in the 
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drafting of policies which are just, sustainable and investor friendly. Such a solution can best be 
described as „expanding the pie‟375 in that instead of focusing on the few jobs held by whites 
(which will not alleviate issues of substance), ways are devised that will advance people 
collectively. This is in line with the test laid down by Moseneke J in Van Heerden where he 
mentioned that the measure be tested by asking if it is advancing the majority of disadvantaged 
persons. 376  Job creation will ensure that those with the required skills have employment 
opportunities and are able to earn adequately for their economic well-being and for the 
alleviation of poverty. 377 
All in all, the recommendations advanced aim to attain a racial balance in the workplace in ways 
that are economically viable and sensitive to individual rights. It is submitted that measures that 
seek to rectify imbalances should target people with demonstrable need of state intervention. It is 
argued that such measures will only be effective if they go to the root cause of inequality, namely 
skills and education. Although these remedies may take time, it is submitted that they are 
preferable because they are more ethical and capable of bringing about significant change. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The fight against inequality aims to attain a unified and diverse state in which human rights reign 
supreme in an economically advanced environment. It is therefore incumbent that all policy and 
laws enacted should not replicate the system from which society has moved away. Although 
affirmative action appeared as a plausible remedy to the problem of inequality, it has sadly failed 
to address the problem of inequality. To compound this failure, it has unwittingly introduced 
additional uncertainties into our law of employment. If the present system continues „resentment 
will be redistributed, the economy will be damaged and social peace destroyed‟.378 
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The dissertation has proposed and motivated the contention that it is no longer desirable to 
continue applying affirmative action indefinitely. The time that has lapsed undermines the 
temporary nature of affirmative action. Further, it has been demonstrated how preferential hiring 
and promotion will always result in conflict between individual equity and collective rights and 
that no standard has managed to harmonize the conflict. Statistics have revealed that up to date 
affirmative action has not fulfilled the purpose it was set out to achieve namely, the significant 
alteration of workplace demographics. Not only has the measure failed to deliver desirable 
results, it has burdened enterprises and remains a threat to business viability. 
 
Chapter three has demonstrated how affirmative action ought to be temporary, how it 
compromises legality and the economy. International instruments and the very nature of 
affirmative action assert that it is a temporary program. It has been nineteen years now since its 
inception and this is long enough to bring us to the point of questioning whether affirmative 
action is still temporary. 
Statistics show how historical racial stratifications persist despite the application of affirmative 
action. This shows how ineffective the measure is in redressing what it set to achieve. This does 
not mean that law cannot channel social redress but simply that legislators have failed to identify 
the sector which ought to be carrying out the redress.  
 Courts have also been grappling with how to balance affirmative action and the right to 
individual equality. The courts have failed to strike a balance between the individual equity 
rights and the redress measures. Judicial certainty is an essential tenet of justice and precedent on 
affirmative action is so inconsistent that the legality of the notion of affirmative action is brought 
to question. 
Not only does affirmative action compromise the constitutional vision of an egalitarian state but 
it also compromises economic development.  It has been shown that affirmative action involves 
preference being given to less qualified personnel on account of their race and for redistributive 
purposes. Resultantly, service delivery and foreign investment have been hampered by the 
consequent emigration of skilled labour. 
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The comparison made between USA and the South African jurisprudence dispelled the 
speculation that, with time, affirmative action will eradicate workplace disparities. Conversant 
with the opposing view that the USA context is different from South Africa; reasons which make 
these jurisdictions comparable were advanced. Statistics show that substantial change did not 
materialize even when the legal approach of the USA was similar to that of South Africa. The 
discussion with regard to the USA jurisprudence was also used to show that even if South Africa 
is to take a different approach affirmative action is still likely to fail.  
Without abandoning the need to attend to societal imbalances, the dissertation has sought to 
criticize the presumption behind affirmative action. This presumption holds that disparate 
distribution of resources emanates solely from past discrimination. It has been established that 
this approach is too narrow because many factors contribute to the current disparities. This does 
not by any means underrate the effects of apartheid on designated groups but advocates a more 
enlightened approach. 
As a solution to the issues discussed above the dissertation has proposed the abrogation of 
affirmative action in the workplace. The reasons advanced include failure to address inequality in 
the workplace. The way affirmative action is applied mirrors a compensatory approach, yet such 
an approach is incompatible with the Constitutional vision of an egalitarian state. It has been 
displayed how affirmative action as it is applied currently focuses on symptoms and not the 
cause of inequality. Most importantly affirmative action has retarded the economy and service 
delivery.  It is rather recommended that efforts should be directed towards empowering the 
disadvantaged by capacitating them to participate meaningfully in the positions to which they 
aspire.  It is further submitted that the use of workplace demographics as a measure of progress is 
heavily flawed; rather success in redress ought to be measured on how many people have been 
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